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Introduction
More than a quarter century has 
passed since Mongolia adopted its first 
independent foreign policy in 1994, 
which indeed saw an unambiguous 
departure from what the country’s status 
was during its Soviet past. Such a far-
sighted initiative aimed at setting the 
tone of Mongolia’s engagement in world 
affairs. Initially, much attention was paid 
on pursuing balanced relations vis-à-vis 
the two geographic neighbours- China 
and Russia. But in order to balance 
off these two neighbours a new idea 
too stepped to the fore which came 
to be known as the ‘third neighbour’ 
policy, perhaps the most innovative 
foreign affairs approach in the country’s 
history, although it was not defined 
in the Foreign Policy Principles and 
National Security Concept when these 
documents were first adopted. The first 
turning point in the Mongolian policy 
of external engagement, however, 
was noticed when the foreign policy 
concept was revised in 2011, taking into 
consideration the national interests in the 
face of China threat perception at least 
economically. Yet, the ‘third neighbour’ 
policy continued to be the focus of 
attention in the Mongolian foreign 
policy resulting in identifying such third 
neighbours who could be purposeful 
partners in a real sense. While all this 
was being pursued with the sole aim of 
safeguarding national interests, another 
turning point appeared on the scene in 
2015. This was a new Mongolian quest 
for a ‘permanent neutrality’ status, though 
it went into oblivion for a simple reason 
often cited as incompatible to Mongolian 
conditions. Mongolia could observe yet 
another turning point in its foreign policy 
conduct after the idea of the Indo-Pacific 
geopolitical construct began gaining 
wide currency since 2010 onwards. The 
Indo-Pacific strategy of Mongolia’s third 
neighbours, especially the United States, 
Japan and India propelled Mongolia to 
upgrade its existing ties with them into a 
strategic partnership. Such a partnership 
is now being considered significant for 
Mongolia’s prosperity within the Indo-
Pacific security framework. 
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It is against this backdrop that this 
paper seeks to highlight the turning points 
in the Mongolian policy of external 
engagement, besides examining the 
expediency and outcomes of these turning 
points in the conduct of Mongolian 
foreign policy. Contextualising the 
foreign policy concepts of 1994 and 
2011 the paper also deals with the 
efficacy of the country’s foreign policy 
behaviour toward external powers in 
terms of ‘two neighbours’ versus ‘third 
neighbour’ paradigm. Nevertheless, 
why did Mongolia need the status of a 
‘permanent neutrality’ is a moot question 
which has been examined purposely 
given that if this status were achieved, 
it would have completely changed the 
Mongolian policy of engagement with 
the outside world. Finally, even though 
Mongolia’s reliance on third neighbours 
is constrained by its geographic isolation, 
its strategic partnership with the United 
States, Japan and India appears to be 
giving an edge to the Mongolian foreign 
policy objectives in the face of China’s 
emergent regional and global hegemony. 
What the ground reality looks like 
is the basis of analysing Mongolia’s 
strategic partnership with the above 
three third neighbours and assessing if 
it is fully coherent with the principles 
of Mongolian foreign policy within the 
security framework of the Indo-Pacific 
construct. Mongolian policy of ‘external 
engagement’ in this paper refers to 
Mongolian foreign-policy strategy which 
largely depends on positive incentives to 
achieve its objectives. 
Evolution of Mongolian Policy of External Engagement
Mongolia has set an example of being 
the most successful democracy among 
the post-communist states of Inner Asia 
which points to the fact that optimism 
towards implementing democratic 
norms in domestic and foreign policies 
worked satisfactorily despite varied 
challenges. In its young democratic 
history, Mongolia has actively tried to 
position and re-identify itself more with 
the democratic values of Europe and 
North America as well as with the highly 
developed democracies of East Asia in 
addition to India, the largest democracy 
1. Daniel Schmücking and Adiyasuren J, “Five Reasons Why Democracy in Mongolia is Working”, Mongolia Focus, 
1 November 2017, Posted by Julian Dierkes at https://blogs.ubc.ca/mongolia/2017/five-factors-in-functioning-
democracy/ (accessed on July 28, 2020).
2. Ariunsanaa Tunjin,“Mongolia’s National Security and Nuclear-Free Policy”, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 
vol.15, no. 1, 2003, p.102.
in the world.1 It all started with the 
rapid democratization of Mongolian 
society and politics in early 1990s that 
prompted the leaders, policy planners and 
academics to reformulate state policies 
and planning with a focus on a speedy 
shift in priorities at all levels. The idea 
was to bring out democratic changes 
in the existing policies so as to ensure 
national security in terms of political, 
social, economic and strategic gains. 
The beginning was made with writing 
a new constitution and installing the 
democratically-elected governments.2 
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Simultaneously, the seven decades old 
unilateral foreign policy was discarded 
that was based on ideological relations 
and “close comprehensive cooperation” 
with the former Soviet Union and other 
COMECON countries.3 The adoption of 
new constitution in 1992 led Mongolia to 
redraw its national security and foreign 
policy, taking into account the reality 
of globalising post-Cold War world that 
offered new possibilities for engagement 
as a foreign-policy option.
What followed next was the adoption 
of the Mongolian Foreign Policy Concept 
in 1994 that was described by many 
quarters as an open foreign policy, free 
from past ideological constraints. In a 
previous article of this author published 
back in 2015, the “third neighbour” 
approach of Mongolia’s diplomacy 
of external relations was explored.4 
The current article offers an argument 
consistent with the earlier one while 
dealing with the main features of 
Mongolian policy of external engagement 
but approaches the problem from a 
completely different perspective. The 
Mongolian Foreign Policy Concept 
provided that the policy priority 
would focus on “safeguarding of its 
[Mongolia’s] security and vital national 
interests by political and diplomatic 
means, and creating a favourable external 
environment for its economic, scientific 
and technological development.”5 
However, Mongolian policy makers kept 
3. Alan J. K. Sanders, “Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy”, in O. Bruun and Richmond O. Odgaard (eds.), Mongolia 
in Transition: Old Patterns, New Challenge, Surrey: Routledge/Curzon, 1997, p.219.
4.  Sharad K Soni, “The ‘Third Neighbor’ Approach of Mongolia’s Diplomacy of External Relations: Effects on Relations 
between India and Mongolia”, India Quarterly, vol. 71, no.1, 2015, pp.37-52. 
5. See “Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign Policy”, Strategic Digest, vol. 26, no. 2, 1996, p.188.
6. Batbayar Tsedendamba, The Dynamic Decade: Mongolian Sovereignty and Foreign Policy between East and West, 
1990-2000, Ulaanbaatar, 2019, pp.263-64. 
7. Sharad K Soni, “The ‘Third Neighbor’ Approach of Mongolia’s Diplomacy of External Relations”, p.40. 
in their mind the following assumptions, 
while framing what is termed as a ‘multi-
pillar’ foreign policy:6
- past experiences of over-reliance 
on a single State, the former 
Soviet Union;
- need of pursuing balanced 
relations with geographic 
neighbours- Russia and China;
- put emphasis on expanding 
relations with industrialized 
nations, especially those who 
supported Mongolia’s move 
towards democracy and market-
oriented economy;
- focus attention on growing 
regional and international 
interdependence;
- realise the increasing importance 
of multilateral systems; and
- underline the significance of 
developing its own economic and 
trade relations.
But then, what was the rationale 
behind using the term ‘multi-pillar’? 
As this author explained in his previous 
article, it “refers to a policy that helps 
develop foreign relations through a 
framework based on a pragmatic, non-
ideological foundation.”7 Therefore, a 
multi-pillar foreign policy is motivated 
by the self-interest strategies chosen by 
a particular state to maximise benefits 
of the whole range of policy objectives 
set on a multi-directional approach. 
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Theoretically, the multi-pillar strategy 
seems to be compatible with a realist 
rational model of state behaviour, at 
least in the sense that self-interest 
and self-preservation are the primary 
motivators of interaction. In this vein, 
the experiences show that national 
interest has been the prime motivator of 
Mongolian foreign policy which has tried 
to safeguard the security and prosperity 
of the country by forming a network 
of external relationships built on the 
interdependence of political, economic 
and other interests. No wonder then that 
pragmatism continues to be the core 
idea of Mongolian foreign policy which 
also relies on the existing international 
political reality as well as the trends of 
international economic development. The 
foreign policy conduct, henceforth, has 
taken its course in accordance with the 
demand of the day.
Initially, during the democratic 
reforms Mongolia focussed its attention 
towards developing political and 
economic cooperation with industrialized 
democracies both in Asia and the 
world. But it had to wait for some 
time for response from the major non-
geographic powers who immediately 
did not assign great significance to 
the direction of Mongolian foreign 
policy. China, on the other hand, was 
quick to respond, perhaps to exploit 
Mongolia for its own economic and 
trade benefits in the absence of any 
major competitor, not even the Russians. 
At the same time, Mongolia’s desire 
of promoting cooperation with the 
8. Alicia Campi, “Mongolia in Northeast Asia-The New Realties”, The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, no. 
12, 2005, p.51.
9. Sharad K. Soni, “China’s Periphery Policy: Implications for Sino-Mongolian Relations”, India Quarterly, vol. 65, no. 
3, 2009, p. 254.
countries of Northeast Asia as well as 
its own integration with this region also 
evolved to a great extent. It is more so 
because the Northeast Asian region is 
considered as a major component of 
the Asia-Pacific, a term which has now 
been replaced by the Indo-Pacific as the 
newest concept for regional order. The 
global maritime narratives thereupon 
too have shifted from Asia-Pacific to 
Indo-Pacific order. As can be noticed, 
in the mid-1990s when no single nation 
came forward to be christened in real 
terms as Mongolia’s “third neighbour”, 
Ulaanbaatar’s idea took a definite turn to 
forge a new relationship with Northeast 
Asia that went beyond economic ties to 
include political concerns.8 Subsequently, 
Northeast Asia also emerged as 
the obvious choice for post-Soviet 
Mongolia’s search for a new regional 
identity.9 Today Mongolia’s alignment 
with Northeast Asia appears to be an 
important factor reflecting the emerging 
security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific 
region.
In the decade of 2000, three major 
developments influenced the Mongolian 
policy of external engagement so much 
so that an urgent need was felt to revise 
the Foreign Policy Concept. It was the 
time which saw (i) China becoming 
the largest investor and also the largest 
trading partner of Mongolia since 2000, 
thus stoking fears of security challenges 
posed by the growing Chinese economic 
influence; (ii) Russia re-entering on 
the Mongolian scene after President 
Putin’s visit in 2000 partly described as 
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
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countering China’s influence;10 and (iii) 
President Bush becoming the first sitting 
US President to visit Mongolia in 2005, 
thus enhancing Mongolia’s hope for more 
close cooperation with the US to balance 
China’s influence. These developments 
resulted in adding economic security 
component to the existing foreign policy 
in addition to bringing into focus a 
complex “balance of influence” element 
as “an indirect balancing strategy against 
overdependence on any one state”,11 
i.e., China in Mongolian case. With 
such strategic directions the revised 
foreign policy came into practice in 
2011 which was the first major turning 
point in the Mongolian policy of 
external engagement. Reeves describes 
the revised foreign policy strategy as 
a combination of “omni-enmeshment 
and balance of influence” in contrast to 
“omni-enmeshment” of original foreign 
policy concept.12 According to Goh, the 
states engaged in omni-enmeshment 
undertake “neither to pick sides nor to 
exclude certain great powers, but rather 
to try to include all the various major 
powers in the region’s strategic affairs”.13 
That is how Mongolia’s 1994 Foreign 
Policy Concept was shaped giving more 
emphasis on balance of power which took 
a new turn in the revised 2011 Concept 
that gave top priority to expanding 
relations with the third neighbours in 
order to balance the influence of the two 
neighbours - Russia and China. 
Post-2011 Strategy of External Engagement 
10111213The efficacy of Mongolia’s strategy 
of external engagement in the post-2011 
period can be gauged through the pattern 
of foreign policy behaviour that has largely 
been determined by the ‘two neighbours’ 
versus ‘third neighbour’ paradigm. 
While maintaining relations with the 
two neighbours - Russia and China, the 
policy core has been not to adopt the 
line of either of these two countries but 
maintain a balanced relationship with 
both of them. At the same time, the 
third neighbour approach to Mongolian 
policy of external engagement gave 
10. Sharad K Soni, “Russian Policy towards Northeast Asia: The Mongolia Factor”, Mongolian Journal of International 
Affairs, vol. 19, 2014, p.41. 
11. Evelyn Goh, “Great Power and Hierarchy Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies”, International 
Security, vol. 32, no. 3, 2007, pp.140-141. 
12. Jeffrey Reeves, “Mongolia's evolving security strategy: omni-enmeshment and balance of influence”, The Pacific 
Review, vol. 25, no. 5, 2012, p.589.
13. Evelyn Goh, “Great Power and Hierarchy Order in Southeast Asia”, p.121.
14. “Mongolia: Growth, Democracy, and Two Wary Neighbors”: An Interview with Alan Wachman, Interview taken 
by Allen Wagner, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 3 May 2012, http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.
aspx?id=245#.Uic9tzbI1K0 (accessed on July 30, 2020).
equal weightage to expanding relations 
with developed countries in the East and 
West. In fact, Mongolia found itself to 
be an important entity both within and 
outside the world owing to its ‘third 
neighbour’ policy which is driven by the 
country’s geopolitical, geo-economic and 
geostrategic concerns. Alan Wachman 
too has stressed that Mongolia’s ‘third 
neighbour’ approach to foreign relations 
“is driven most forcefully by geography.”14 
Since the 2011 Foreign Policy Concept 
clearly identified the United States, Japan, 
the European Union, India, South Korea 
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and Turkey as Mongolia’s preferred third 
neighbour partners,15 the dominant stated 
theme of Mongolian policy of external 
engagement has been the ‘third neighbour’ 
policy. But, it cannot be an exaggeration 
to say that the post-2011 foreign policy 
behaviour followed more or less the 
same pattern as that of post-2000 period 
in exhibiting “attempts by successive 
Mongolian administrations to build closer 
ties with partners other than Russia and 
China, its dominant neighbours.”16 The 
only difference in the pattern of foreign 
policy behaviour of the two connecting 
periods was that the perception of ‘third 
neighbour’ policy changed to become 
more forceful after it received focussed 
attention in the revised Foreign Policy 
Concept.
Instances of defining the ‘third 
neighbour’ policy by the Mongolian 
policy makers and academics in the 
post-2000 period but before 2011 was 
visible concretely. For example, in 
2002, Tsedendamba Batbayar, a veteran 
academician and diplomat, argued the 
logical reasons behind Mongolia needing 
a third neighbour. In his opinion, the 
main logic was/is “political realism” or 
Mongolian “realpolitik” the manifestation 
of which lies into the fact that “because 
of the lack of necessary political and 
15. Jargalsaikhan Mendee, “Mongolia’s Quest for Third Neighbors: Why the European Union?”, EUCAM Policy Brief, no. 
25, 2012, p.2. 
16. Julian Dierkes, “Mongolia’s ‘third neighbor’ policy and its impact on foreign investment”, 15 February 2011, East 
Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/15/mongolias-third-neighbor-policy-and-its-impact-on-foreign-
investment/ (accessed on July 30, 2020).
17. Tsedendamba Batbayar, “Mongolia’s New Identity and Security Dilemmas”, The Mongolian Journal of International 
Affairs, no. 8-9, 2002, pp.9-10. 
18. “Mongolia’s Foreign Policy: Efforts Towards Regional Peace and Security”, Address by Nambaryn Enkhbayar, 
President of Mongolia at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, USA, 23 October 2007.
19. Ibid.
20. A.Tuvshintugs, “Mongolia’s National Security: Past, Present and Future Perspectives”, in K. Warikoo and Sharad 
K. Soni (eds.), Mongolia in the 21st Century: Society, Culture and International Relations, New Delhi and London: 
Pentagon, 2010, p. 76.
economic weight to implement its 
declared national security policy, 
Mongolia needs a strong third power as 
a counterweight to balance its relations 
with the immediate neighbours.”17 A few 
years later in 2007, while addressing a 
gathering at the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington DC, 
the then Mongolian President Nambaryn 
Enkhbayar further defined the “third 
neighbour” policy by what it meant that 
“Mongolia will no longer be dependent 
only on one neighbour but rather on 
as many countries and international 
institutions as possible.”18 He argued 
that “it brings about the necessity to 
develop ‘neighbourly’ relations with such 
important players at the international arena 
as the US, Europe, Japan, India, the UN 
and others, thus securing the independence 
of the country.”19 Roughly at the same 
time, Mongolian foreign policy analyst 
A. Tuvshintugs accentuated that the ‘third 
neighbour’ policy easily explains the 
“multipillarity, complexity and openness 
of Mongolia’s foreign policy.”20 
However, following the 
implementation of the 2011 revised 
Foreign Policy Concept Alan Wachman 
commented that “by linking its security 
to a roster of states other than Russia and 
China, Mongolia has made its intention 
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
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clear to act internationally with as much 
freedom as it can muster from constraints 
that Moscow or Beijing might wish to 
impose”.21 On the other hand, both Russia 
and China have remained cautious of 
external third powers, particularly the 
United States, setting down roots in states 
along their borders.22 Yet, Ulaanbaatar’s 
hope has not diminished in pursuing 
the third neighbour policy under the 
impression that such an approach to 
security will “encourage those external 
balancers [third neighbours] to develop 
interests - economic, ideological, and 
strategic - in Mongolia that would 
significantly impede the effort of either 
Russia or China to trample Mongolia’s 
independence.”23 In addition, the third 
neighbour policy also helped create new 
strategic alliances abroad without causing 
economic and commercial issues with 
the Russians and Chinese largely because 
of the Mongolian credence that diverse 
foreign and trade relations are an element 
of broader stability. The economic 
stability in terms of growth has, however, 
seen a down turn, especially since 2012. 
In 2016, the economic growth went down 
to as low as 1.1 percent in comparison 
to a whooping figure of 17.3 percent in 
2011 until it started recovery to reach at 
5.1 percent in 2019,24 thanks to a US$5.5 
21. “Mongolia: Growth, Democracy, and Two Wary Neighbors”: An Interview with Alan Wachman (2012).
22. Vaishali Krishna, “Mongolian Foreign Policy Implications for Russia and China”, The Mongolian Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 19, 2014, p.75. 
23. “Mongolia: Growth, Democracy, and Two Wary Neighbors”: An Interview with Alan Wachman (2012). 
24. The World Bank, “GDP growth (annual %) – Mongolia”, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.
KD.ZG?locations=MN (accessed on August 10, 2020).
25. Sharad K Soni, “Mongolia’s new President is Mongolia first and China last”, East Asia Forum, 11 August 2017, https://
www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/08/11/mongolias-new-president-is-mongolia-first-and-china-last/ (accessed on August 
10, 2020).
26. Alicia Campi, “Mongolia and the Dilemmas of Deepening Continentalism”, Mongolian Journal of International 
Affairs, vol. 20, 2018, p.6.
27. Jeff Goodson and Jonathan Addleton, “How Great Power Competition Is Changing the Geopolitics of Mongolia” 29 
January 2020, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/01/29/how_great_power_competition_is_changing_
the_geopolitics_of_mongolia_115003.html (accessed on August 10, 2020).
billion IMF bailout to Mongolia in 2017 
amid sluggish trade with China as well 
as a resurgence in the coal trade in the 
region.25
While the central focus of Mongolia’s 
‘third neighbour’ policy has been to 
develop a partnership, both strategic and 
comprehensive, with the world’s leading 
nations, Alicia Campi maintains that 
“over the years Mongolian policymakers 
have adjusted the content of the ‘third 
neighbour’ policy to reflect the realities 
faced”.26 Nonetheless, one crucial 
challenge faced by the Mongolian 
leadership has always been to achieve 
a balance of influence between the 
two neighbours - Russia and China by 
building on the strong economic and 
political competition in which they 
engage in Mongolia. If China, with a 
market share of more than 70 per cent 
of Mongolian exports, has indisputably 
remained the largest economic partner 
of Mongolia, Russia has not been left 
behind in rebuilding and strengthening 
its economic ties there. Russia supplies 
about 80 percent of Mongolia’s oil market, 
while trade has risen nearly 40 percent 
since 2017.27 In such a scenario, a cause 
of serious concern appears to be the 
dependence problem which Mongolia 
would not like to face anytime in the 
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future. But huge mineral resources is the 
redeeming feature attracting the appetite 
of many other players, and that is where 
Mongolia could manipulate the third 
neighbours to balance off Russia and 
China. Back in 2012, perhaps Robert 
Bedeski was right when he pointed out 
that “breaking isolation through economic 
development facilitated by foreign 
investment, diplomacy and engagement 
has paid off in a short time, but requires 
constant attention and commitment by 
non-contiguous neighbours.”28 
As of now while Mongolia 
has established “Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership” with Russia 
and China, it has also entered into 
“Strategic Partnership” with the United 
States of America, Japan and India, 
“Comprehensive Partnership” with 
the Republic of Korea, Germany and 
Turkey, “Expanded Partnership” with 
Canada, Australia and Kazakhstan, 
and “Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement” with the European 
Union. This is an indicative of the 
fact that the Mongolian foreign policy 
behavior has been following the 
pattern of the ‘two neighbours’ versus 
‘third neighbour’ paradigm by giving 
top priority to expanding relations 
with the third neighbours in order 
to balance the influence of the two 
contiguous neighbours.29 Amid all these 
developments the second major turning 
point in Mongolian policy of external 
engagement was witnessed when the idea 
of a ‘permanent neutrality’ status was 
sought, though it was short-lived.
Ephemeral Quest for ‘Permanent Neutrality’
2829The idea of a ‘Permanent Neutrality’ 
status similar to that enjoyed by 
Switzerland and Turkmenistan was first 
propounded by the former Mongolian 
President Ts. Elbegdorj during his 
speech on September 14, 2015 when 
he disclosed quite a new dimension of 
Mongolia’s foreign policy. Explaining 
at length the meaning of ‘Permanent 
Neutrality’ he spoke with a conviction 
that although “Mongolia did not declare 
herself ‘as a permanently neutral state’, 
yet in substance, form and action its 
28. Robert E. Bedeski, “Asiatica: Sino-Russian heartland and the Mongolian state”, in Robert E. Bedeski and 
Niklas Swanström (eds.), Eurasia's Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: Rivalry or partnership for China, Russia and 
Central Asia?, London and New York: Routledge, 2012, p.230.
29. Sharad K Soni, “Geopolitical Dilemma of Small States in External Relations: Mongolia’s Tryst with ‘Immediate’ and 
‘Third’ Neighbours”, Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 20, 2018, p.28. For more details, read pp.33-43. 
30. “President Speech: Mongolia - Neutrality”, 14 September 2015, https://news.mn/en/222154/ (accessed on September 
16, 2020). 
foreign policy is fully coherent with the 
principles of neutral foreign policy.”30 
Two weeks later on September 29, 2015, 
the idea of ‘Permanent Neutrality’ found 
its place in Elbegdorj’s speech at the 70th 
Session of the UN General Assembly. 
Stating that Mongolia’s “national laws and 
international commitments are consistent 
with neutrality principles”, he urged the 
General Assembly for its “sympathy 
and support for Mongolia’s peaceful, 
open, neutral and active foreign policy 
efforts” adding that “Mongolia’s status 
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
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of permanent neutrality will contribute 
to the strengthening of peace, security, 
and development in our region and the 
world at large.”31 Soon after Mongolian 
policy makers started campaigning, 
both internally and externally, for 
institutionalizing a ‘permanent neutrality’ 
status, though intensive debates among the 
country’s political elite on whether or not 
Mongolia should endorse such a policy, 
came to the fore beyond imagination of 
friends abroad. They remained firm in 
their opinion that since the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union, the country has been 
genuinely neutral, despite close relations 
with the U.S. that resulted in sending 
Mongolian troops and instructors to Iraq 
and Afghanistan. 
However, the debate on the issue of 
permanent neutrality at that point of time 
took note of the “changing geopolitical 
dynamics in Inner Asia,”32 particularly 
in the wake of commitments made by 
Beijing and Moscow to carry forward 
their respective strategic partnership 
and broader economic cooperation with 
Mongolia. The deftness with which 
Mongolia managed its post-communist 
foreign policy then appeared to have 
removed the dilemma of whether or not 
31. “Statement by His Excellency Tsakhiagiln Elbegdorj, President of Mongolia, at the General Debate of the 70th Session 
of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 29 September 2015, p.6, https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/
files/gastatements/70/70_MN_en.pdf (accessed on September 16, 2020).
32. Mendee Jargalsaikhan, “Permanent Neutrality Debate in Mongolia”, Asia Pacific Memo, 355, 7 December 2015, 
https://apm.iar.ubc.ca/permanent-neutrality-debate-in-mongolia/(accessed on September 16, 2020).
33. Anthony Rinna, “Why Mongolian neutrality is significant for Russian security”, Russia Direct. 5 May 2016, http://
rbth.com/opinion/2016/05/05/why-is-mongolian-neutrality-significant-for-russian-security_590127(accessed on 
September 16, 2020).
34. Cited in Morris Rossabi, “Mongolia's Mangled Politics: How the Parliamentary Election will Play Out”, Foreign 
Affairs, 30 May 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/mongolia/2016-05-30/mongolias-mangled-politics 
(accessed on September 20, 2020).
35. Ganbat Namjilsangarav, “Mongolia, between big neighbors, seeks permanent neutrality”, AP News, 2 November, 2015, 
https://apnews.com/article/b2914143bda3481680539687899db471 (accessed on September 21, 2020).
36. Julian Dierkes, “Permanent Neutrality of Mongolian Foreign Policy”, IndraStra Global, 8 January 2020, http://www.
indrastra.com/2016/01/OPINION-Permanent-Neutrality-of-Mongolian-Foreign-Policy-002-01-2016-0022.html 
(accessed on September 21, 2020).
Mongolia would have to choose to align 
politically and militarily with China, 
Russia or the West.33 While Elbegdorj 
asserted that Mongolia had essentially 
been neutral in all but name, analysts like 
Viktor Samoylenko of the Moscow State 
Institute of International Relations drew 
attention to a point that “neutrality can 
only be successful if a country enjoys 
a sound economic standing and is not 
overly dependent on other countries for 
financing and investment.”34 Defending 
neutrality Choinkhor Jalbuu, Director of 
the Mongolian Geopolitical Institute and 
former Ambassador to the U.S. was quoted 
as saying that “having permanent neutrality 
doesn’t mean isolation from international 
community, in simple words it is a position 
that Mongolia will not join any side against 
any country.”35 Another viewpoint was 
that neutrality seemed to be “a logical 
extension of the ‘third neighbour’ policy 
rather than a real departure from this.”36 
In his interpretation Julien Dierkes 
emphasised that “permanent neutrality 
takes one of the main motivations for 
the ‘Third Neighbour Policy’... to a next 
step by permanently declaring Mongolia 
to remain in between the two neighbours 
[Russia and China], not siding with one 
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or the other, and not aligning militarily 
with any outside party to neutralize any... 
notion of threats against these neighbours 
emanating from Mongolia.”37 
Mongolian foreign policy experts 
too asserted that permanent neutrality 
would not change the fundamental 
course of country’s foreign policy, 
such as Mongolia’s ability to balance 
between China and Russia as well as the 
“third neighbour” aspect of country’s 
external relations. Yet, the move towards 
neutrality status was of “little value”, 
stressed Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan, 
Mongolia’s former representative to 
the OSCE, “unless China and Russia 
rein in their diplomatic and economic 
pressure on Mongolia, raising doubts 
about the significance of the exercise.”38 
Notwithstanding the diverse opinion 
emanating from the debates, neutrality 
basically permeates a country with 
protection for its territory and people 
as long as it avoids involvement in 
armed conflict. In the Mongolian case, 
declaring a permanent neutrality status 
was conceived to be a simple procedure 
but maintaining that status, especially in 
the defence and security sector, would 
not have been an easy task. The ground 
reality points to the fact that due to its 
location and geo-strategic situation, 
neutrality might have caused Mongolia to 
be disconnected from international politics 
and the political-economic interests 
of cooperating countries including 
37. Ibid.
38. Ganbat Namjilsangarav, “Mongolia, between big neighbors, seeks permanent neutrality”.
39. Jessica L. Beyer, and Stephanie C. Hofmann, “Varieties of Neutrality Norm Revision and Decline,” Cooperation and 
Conflict, vol. 46, no. 3, 2011, pp.285–311. 
40. Mendee Jargalsaikhan, “Permanent Neutrality Debate in Mongolia”.
41. T.Bayarbat, “Does Mongolia Need Permanent Neutrality?”, The UB Post, 12 January 2018, https://www.pressreader.
com/mongolia/the-ub-post/20180112/281685435244816 (accessed September 25, 2020). 
neighbours. It is more so because in the 
contemporary security environments, most 
countries including the small states prefer 
to settle the disputes through peaceful and 
diplomatic means by close coordination 
with regional and international 
organizations in order to maintain global 
and regional peace and security.39 
Therefore, as Mendee Jargalsaikhan 
speculated that, “the most logical 
and pragmatic way to survive in this 
complicated and rapidly changing 
landscape, and [to] balance multiple 
political and economic aims is not 
to freeze the country’s [Mongolia’s] 
pragmatic foreign policy via permanent 
neutrality, but instead strengthen its 
links to global, regional and bilateral 
structures.”40 Many would agree that it 
was not clear what the real benefits for 
declaring a permanent neutral status 
would be and, hence, following the 
departure of Elbegdorj it was no longer 
considered to be the realistic foreign 
policy choice for Mongolia whose two 
powerful neighbours - Russia and China 
are “enjoying a more friendly relations 
than at any point in history.”41 Moreover, 
since the current Mongolian President 
Khaltmaa Battulga has tried to strike 
a pragmatic tone in the foreign policy 
conduct, the issue of permanent neutrality 
does no longer seem to be a serious 
matter for discussion in public debates. 
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One of the major developments 
the world has witnessed in the current 
decade has been the wider acceptance of 
the concept of ‘Indo-Pacific’ among the 
policy-makers, analysts and academics 
in Asia and beyond. The Indo-Pacific as 
a newer geopolitical construct has now 
replaced the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ which has, 
in recent years, undergone unprecedented 
developments in the regional order with 
varied opportunities and challenges for 
the stakeholders. Both the cooperation 
and competition have become prominent 
in the region, though the idea has been “to 
connect countries that lie between Indian 
Ocean and Pacific Ocean into an integrated 
and interconnected Indo-Pacific.”42 
As such new initiatives in the foreign 
policies of the countries belonging to the 
region have been taken to suit the Indo-
Pacific security framework. Mongolian 
foreign policy or the policy of its external 
engagement too has been witnessing 
positive adjustments to fit into the Indo-
Pacific strategy of its third neighbours, 
especially the United States, Japan and 
India. All three are influential democracies 
with common strategic interests in the 
Indo-Pacific because of the region’s 
enormous geo-economic opportunities 
on the one hand and on the other, China’s 
increasing politico-military assertiveness 
that poses formidable security challenges, 
not only for Asia but also for the rest of 
42. Angel Damayanti, “Indo-Pacific Connectivity: Toward Competition or Cooperation?”, Asian Studies International 
Journal, vol. I, no.1, December 2019, p.1.  
43. Patrick Mendis and Itgelt Bat-ochir, “Mongolia’s ‘Eternal’ Neighbors and the Two New ‘Strategic’ Neighbors of the 
Indo-Pacific”, China US Focus, 12 December 2019, at www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/mongolias-eternal-
neighbors-and-the-two-new-strategic-neighbors-of-the-indo-pacific- (accessed on September 28, 2020).
44. Dulguun, “Researcher D. Bayarkhuu delves into Mongolia-US strategic partnership”, 9 August 2019, https://theubposts.
com/researcher-d-bayarkhuu-delves-into-mongolia-us-strategic-partnership/(accessed on September 30, 2020).
the world. In such a challenging regional 
security environment, Mongolia’s 
relationship with these third neighbours 
have undergone a remarkable turnaround. 
To begin with, Mongolia’s entry into 
‘Strategic Partnership’ with the U.S., 
Japan and India can well be described as 
a significant step given that Ulaanbaatar 
“needs a balance-of-power strategy and 
preventive diplomacy to avoid being 
victimised by its powerful neighbours.”43 
But what does strategic partnership 
mean? In an interview with The UB Post, 
Mongolian researcher D. Bayarkhuu 
describes it as “the highest step of 
bilateral relations and cooperation” 
which “can’t be valued with money” as 
“it is the foundation to deepen mutual 
trust and cooperation.”44 According to 
him, becoming higher than a strategic 
partnership means reaching “alliance” 
level which Mongolia will probably 
not want to do as it could go against the 
interests of its partner countries including 
Russia and China. As of now Mongolia 
has signed a strategic partnership 
agreement with five countries, i.e., Russia 
(2006), Japan (2010), China (2014), 
India (2015) and the U.S. (2019). In this 
scenario, Mongolia’s ‘third neighbour’ 
policy appears to be becoming truly 
effective despite growing Chinese and 
Russian presence, especially in the 
economic and trade fields. A strategic 
Strategic Partnership with Third Neighbours of Indo-Pacific
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partnership with China and Russia is 
indeed a balancing act on the part of 
Mongolia which gives a guarantee 
that neither Moscow nor Beijing could 
dominate Mongolia outrightly. However, 
strategic partnership agreements with 
the U.S., Japan and India have altogether 
different connotation from those signed 
with China and Russia.
Japan is credited with being the first 
third neighbour of Mongolia to have 
signed a strategic partnership agreement in 
2010. Although it has been the poster child 
for Mongolia’s third neighbour policy, 
until 2010 Japanese support to Mongolia 
was just confined to providing grants 
and financial aid, thus not reaping many 
tangible benefits. However, increasing 
Chinese influence in the region, Northeast 
Asia in particular and Indo-Pacific in 
general, forced Japan to seek new levels 
of partnerships in economic and security 
fields, thus opening the door for Mongolia 
and Japan to upgrade their ties to the level 
of a strategic partnership. The two sides 
are now committed to promote concrete 
cooperation to realize the Japanese vision 
of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”.45 The 
second third neighbour that entered into 
a strategic partnership agreement with 
Mongolia is India, known for a long 
time now as a ‘spiritual neighbour’ for 
the Mongols. As India’s own approach 
toward the Indo-Pacific is shaped by a 
45. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-Mongolia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, 16 June 2019, https://www.mofa.
go.jp/a_o/c_m1/page3e_001030.html (accessed on September 28, 2020).
46. Darshana M. Baruah, “India in the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi’s Theater of Opportunity”, Working Paper, Washington 
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2020, p.3, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Baruah_
UnderstandingIndia_final1.pdf (accessed on September 28, 2020). 
47. Saurabh Todi, “India Gets Serious About the Indo-Pacific: Can India walk the talk on the Indo-Pacific?”, The 
Diplomat, 18 December, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/india-gets-serious-about-the-indo-pacific/ (accessed 
on September 28, 2020).  
48. Sharad K Soni, “Emerging Dimensions of India-Mongolia Relations”, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, vol. 11, no. 1, 
January-March 2016, p.54. 
new strategic and security environment 
coinciding with China’s rising ambitions, 
especially in the Indian Ocean region and 
South Asia,46 New Delhi has adopted an 
Indo-Pacific strategy for “a free, open, 
and inclusive region - one that includes 
all nations within this geography as well 
as others beyond with a stake in it.”47 In 
order to manage the Chinese ambitions 
and secure its own strategic interests in 
the Indo-Pacific region, India needed 
to cultivate good relations in China’s 
neighbourhood, and hence willing to 
upgrade its ties with Mongolia who was 
equally interested to do so for securing 
herself from China threat perception. It 
was the time when India under Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi began revamping 
its foreign policy which in the case of 
Mongolia suited under ‘Act East’ policy 
within the larger Indo-Pacific strategy. 
Since both India and Mongolia offer a 
newer opportunity and strategic leverage 
for each other in dealing with China, 
Modi’s visit to Mongolia in 2015 can 
be termed as “more of a strategic step” 
that culminated in signing a strategic 
partnership agreement.48 Further, during 
Mongolian President Battulga’s visit to 
India in 2019, Mongolian side expressed 
commitment to continue to deepen and 
broaden their strategic partnership besides 
extending support to India’s “Indo-Pacific 
Vision” by actively participating in 
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
76 Vol. 21, December 2020
evolving regional integration in the Indo-
Pacific region.49
The latest among the third neighbour 
countries which has inked a strategic 
partnership agreement with Mongolia 
is the United States. It was done in late 
2019 during President Battulga’s first 
state visit to the United States, thereby 
reinforcing the U.S. Department of 
Defence’s Indo-Pacific Strategy report. 
The report released on June 1, 2019 
described Mongolia as one of the 
“democracies in Indo-Pacific,” that are 
“reliable, capable, and natural partners of 
the United States.”50 Battulga too pointed 
out that the strength of Mongolia’s 
contemporary foreign policy is based 
on three factors: (a) continuing good 
neighbour relations with Russia and 
China; (b) gaining a strategic place in the 
Asia-Pacific by contributing to security 
and peace dialogues; and (c) being 
an active member of both global and 
regional economic groupings, particularly 
the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.51 One may 
think that perhaps at first glance on the 
world map Mongolia doesn’t seem to be 
a country of strategic importance outside 
Russia and China, then why is Mongolia 
being considered as strategically 
important to the US. According to 
49. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Statement on Strengthening the Strategic Partnership 
between India and Mongolia”, 20 September 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/31841/Joint_
Statement_on_Strengthening_the_Strategic_Partnership_between_India_and_Mongolia (accessed on September 30, 
2020). 
50. Bolor Lkhaajav, “US Becomes Mongolia’s 5th Strategic Partner”, The Diplomat, 5 August 2019, https://thediplomat.
com/2019/08/us-becomes-mongolias-5th-strategic-partner/ (accessed on September 30, 2020). 
51. Ibid. 
52. Robert D. Kaplan, “Supremacy by Stealth”, The Atlantic Monthly, July/August 2003, http://www.theatlantic.com/
issues/2003/07/kaplan.htm (accessed on September 28, 2020).
53. The U.S. Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a 
Networked Region”, 1 June 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-
DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF (accessed on September 30, 2020). 
54.  “Pompeo to visit Japan, South Korea and Mongolia next week”, Nikkei Asia, 30 September 2020, https://asia.nikkei.
com/Politics/International-relations/Pompeo-to-visit-Japan-South-Korea-and-Mongolia-next-week(accessed on 
September 30, 2020).
Robert Kaplan, “we live in an era when 
‘anyplace can turn out to be strategic’ 
and after 9/11 Central Asia, including 
Mongolia, became ‘strategic’ to the 
US.”52 Since Mongolia is now a declared 
strategic U.S. ally in the Indo-Pacific, 
it is committed to pursue its policy of 
external engagement along the Indo-
Pacific order. The U.S. vision for a “free 
and open Indo-Pacific” was announced 
by President Donald Trump in 2017 at 
the APEC Summit in Vietnam, where 
“commitment was made to a safe, secure, 
prosperous, and free region that benefits 
all nations.”53 
However, the Indo-Pacific is in many 
respects closely linked to various aspects 
of the Sino-American rivalry. The relations 
between the two sides are at the lowest 
point in decades, with the world’s top two 
economies at odds over issues ranging 
from China’s handling of the Covid-19 
pandemic to trade rivalries, new national 
security legislation in Hong Kong and 
tensions in the South China Sea.54 In 
such a scenario, different cooperative 
mechanisms in the form of democratic 
trilateral as well as quadrilateral 
relationships have emerged. The U.S.-
Japan-Mongolia trilateral relationship is 
connected to the Indo-Pacific strategy, 
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5556Since the main purpose of a 
country’s policy of external engagement 
is to conduct foreign relations to 
the best possible advantage to its 
national interests, Mongolia too has 
been following the same agenda with 
relevant adjustments in the existing 
policy as per the situational demands. 
The expediency and outcomes of the 
turning points in Mongolian policy of 
external engagement, however, reveal 
that the core principles of Mongolia’s 
‘Multi-Pillar’ foreign policy have never 
been compromised in order to ensure 
the country’s security and independent 
existence in the multi-polar world. The 
55. U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on U.S.-Japan-Mongolia Trilateral Meeting”, 10 January 2020, https://www.state.
gov/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-japan-mongolia-trilateral-meeting/(accessed on September 30, 2020).
56. Ankit Panda, “US, India, Australia, Japan ‘Quad’ Holds Senior Officials Meetings in Bangkok,” Diplomat, November 
5, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/us-india-australia-japan-quad-holds-senior-officials- meeting-in-bangkok/ 
(accessed on September 30, 2020).
foreign policy with regard to the two 
geographic neighbours-Russia and China, 
has been to balance each of them, while 
in order to balance both of them a new 
strategy styled as the ‘third neighbour’ 
policy was implemented. And there 
is no denying that Mongolian foreign 
policy, irrespective of adjustments 
made in it, has actually been focussing 
on developing friendly and mutually 
beneficial ties mostly with democratic 
states beyond its powerful immediate 
neighbours. Faced with growing security 
concerns, especially Chinese economic 
pressure, Mongolia tried to look for 
viable third neighbours to be long 
but in no way it can be described as an 
alternative to Mongolia-Russia-China 
Economic Corridor initiated as part of 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At 
a trilateral meeting of the United States, 
Japan, and Mongolia held in Washington 
on January 10, 2020, both the U.S. and 
Japan “reaffirmed their commitment to 
strengthening their bilateral relationships 
with Mongolia in line with Mongolia’s 
‘third neighbour’ policy and the three 
sides’ visions for a free and open Indo-
Pacific.”55 The Quadrilateral Group (or 
Quad) of Australia, India, Japan, and 
the United States has been quite active 
in recent times due to growing concerns 
about Chinese foreign policy and its 
assertive regional influence. Such concerns 
gave way to holding a Ministerial-level 
meeting of the Quad in 2019 to have 
“consultations on collective efforts to 
advance a free, open, and inclusive Indo-
Pacific.”56 Nevertheless, looking at Modi’s 
2018 Shangri-La speech that interlaced the 
importance of partnerships in India’s Indo-
Pacific approach, Mongolia should explore 
the strategic and diplomatic opportunities 
to initiate a quadrilateral cooperation with 
the U.S., Japan and India. It would help 
Mongolia utilise the full potential of its 
strategic partnership with these three third 
neighbours for regional peace within the 
Indo-Pacific security framework.
Conclusion 
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term partners. This helped Mongolia 
to overcome geopolitical dilemma and 
diversify its external engagements 
to reduce overwhelming dependence 
on ‘two’ immediate neighbours. The 
third neighbours, especially the U.S., 
Japan and India figured prominently 
in Mongolia’s pragmatic foreign 
policy to strengthen its links to global, 
regional and bilateral structures through 
cooperative partnerships. Amid all these 
developments the issue of ‘permanent 
neutrality’ did make its headway, though 
it proved to be ephemeral.
With the Indo-Pacific emerging as a 
newer geopolitical construct, Mongolia’s 
individual strategic partnership with 
the United States, Japan and India has 
enhanced the scope of Mongolia’s 
reliance on third neighbours for its 
participation in evolving regional 
integration in the Indo-Pacific region. As 
of now, the common factor that could 
bind all the four countries bilaterally 
and multilaterally in the Indo-Pacific is 
how to cooperate in containing Chinese 
hegemonic behaviour and ensuring 
a prosperous and peaceful future for 
a region of sovereign, independent, 
and democratic states. The strategic 
partnership agreements with the three 
third neighbours, thus, appear to be 
fully coherent with the principles of 
Mongolian policy of external engagement 
being carried out within the security 
framework of Indo-Pacific construct. 
These agreements also show significant 
progress in Mongolia’s regional outlook, 
besides demonstrating the strategic 
significance of the third neighbour policy. 
Yet, one must not ignore the fact that in 
the fast changing global and regional 
political and security environment, 
Mongolia’s political stability, economic 
developments, feasible security 
surroundings, and forward-looking 
foreign policy strategies are crucial for 
not only keeping its democratic credential 
intact but also keeping pace with new 
developments in the Indo-Pacific.
